Whose Fault Is it Anyway? Political Orientation, Attributions of Responsibility, and Support for the War in Iraq by Friese, Malte et al.
Whose Fault Is it Anyway? Political Orientation,
Attributions of Responsibility, and Support for the War
in Iraq
Malte Friese Æ Shira Fishman Æ Ruth Beatson Æ
Kelly Sauerwein Æ Blanka Rip
Published online: 21 April 2009
 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009
Abstract Political orientation has been shown to be a strong predictor of attitudes
toward war. Specifically, political conservatism has been associated with increased
support for war and with decreased attribution of responsibility for war to one’s own
government. The present research aims to test whether the relationship between
political orientation and support for the war in Iraq is mediated by attributions of
government responsibility. In Study 1, survey data showed that the relationship
between political orientation and support for the Iraq war was mediated by beliefs
about the US government’s motivations for the war. Study 2 provided a conceptual
replication of the proposed mediation model and extended the findings from beliefs
about US government motivations to perceived threat from the pre-war Iraqi gov-
ernment. Study 3 used an experimental paradigm to manipulate perceived threat to
show that such beliefs directly affected support for the war. Implications and
directions for future research are discussed.
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Since the arrival of US troops in Iraq in March 2003, the war has been highly contested.
Thousands of Iraqi and allied troops have died or been wounded in combat. The
financial costs of the war, especially in a time of economic difficulty, have been
extensive. American taxpayers contributed $845 billion directly to the war, and the
total cost to the US involvement has been estimated at around $3 trillion (Reuters,
2008). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that public support for the war in Iraq has
declined considerably. In March 2003, shortly after troops were sent to Iraq, polls
showed that 75% of North Americans believed that the invasion was the right decision,
and 23% believed it was a mistake. Five years later, these statistics were considerably
changed. In April 2008, polls showed that 63% of the US population believed that the
US had made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, whereas only 36% believed that the
war was the right course of action (Gallup Poll, 2003, 2008).
Upon closer investigation, diminishing support for the war is only part of the
story. A more nuanced view reveals that even before the onset of the invasion,
people holding conservative political views were more in favor of the war than were
people holding liberal attitudes (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2003). While both
liberals and conservatives have decreased their support for the war, the divide
between the two ideologies persists, leading some authors to speak of ‘‘separate
realities of Republicans and Democrats’’ (World Public Opinion, 2006). But why
should liberals and conservatives support the war to such different degrees?
The current article attempts to address what accounts for this ideological divide.
It is assumed that depending on their political orientation people have different
views on the question of who was responsible for the war. A set of three studies
explores the possibility that these differing attributions of responsibility among
liberals and conservatives constitutes a mediating mechanism through which
political orientation leads to varying support for the war in Iraq.
The Debate over Political Orientation
The social science literature provides a rich and decades-long debate about political
orientation (or political ideology), its roots, and consequences for people in their
political and social lives. Some authors have argued that political orientation,
defined as a set of coherent and relatively stable political views, does not exist at all
(e.g., Converse, 1964; Lipset, 1960; Shils, 1958). In contrast, other authors have
challenged this view and provided evidence that political orientation, as a construct,
is a useful mechanism for understanding human behavior (e.g., Jost, 2006; Jost,
Nosek, & Gosling, 2008).
In a recent meta-analysis, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003; see also
Jost et al., 2007) suggest that varying psychological needs to manage uncertainty, fear,
and threat lie at the root of individual differences in political orientation. According to
this motivated social cognition perspective, people endorse political views, in part, to
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satisfy these psychological needs and not just because they comply with rational
liberal or conservative arguments. In fact, ‘‘rational’’ beliefs and convictions are
partially influenced by the desire to fulfill these psychological needs. In line with this
reasoning, Jost et al. (2003) identified a number of personality characteristics assumed
to facilitate the management of uncertainty, fear, and threat, and predict political
conservatism (e.g., authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, need for closure
and structure, intolerance of ambiguity). Because individual differences in political
orientation can be explained by general personality characteristics, thoughts and
behaviors not typically regarded as bearing any systemic relationship to political
orientation may be influenced by one’s political orientation. For example, Carney,
Jost, Gosling, and Potter (2008) found that conservatives (as compared to liberals) tend
to own household items associated with orderliness (e.g., ironing boards, laundry
baskets) and planning (e.g., event calendars). In contrast, liberals are more likely than
conservatives to have items that signal interest in new experiences and diversity (e.g.,
international maps, greater variety of music CDs, and books).
The personality characteristics associated with differences in political orientation
are assumed to develop early in life and are observable even at nursery school
(Block & Block, 2006). Some variance in these psychological needs may be
transferred genetically, as recent evidence suggests that political orientation has a
genetic component (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005). Differences between liberals
and conservatives can be traced to the level of information processing (Skitka,
Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002), neurocognition (Amodio, Jost,
Master, & Yee, 2007), and physiological traits (Oxley et al., 2008). Thus, political
orientation appears to reflect deeply rooted and pervasive individual differences in
the need to manage uncertainty and threat.
Political Orientation, Support for War, and Attribution Styles
According to the perspective of political orientation as motivated social cognition,
people embrace conservative policies, in part, because these policies often serve to
reduce their fear and anxiety (Jost et al., 2003). This view fits well with findings that
conservatives support governmental military spending to a greater extent than liberals,
presumably because the military may protect against potential future threats (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Further corroborating this view, political
conservatism has been associated with greater support for war (Agnew, Hoffman,
Lehmiller, & Duncan, 2007; Grote, Frieze, & Schmidt, 1997), and this result extends
to support for the current war in Iraq. Compared to liberals, conservatives were more in
favor of military action to end Saddam Hussein’s rule before the war started, and they
were more likely to continue to think that the war was the right decision after public
opinion started to turn (e.g., World Public Opinion, 2006).
Political orientation also affects individual attribution styles. More than liberals,
conservatives tend to attribute difficult personal situations such as homelessness and
poverty to internal causes (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Pellegrini,
Queirolo, Monarrez, & Valenzuela, 1997; Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock, & Brady,
1986). Similarly, conservatives see wrongdoers as personally responsible and
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accountable for their misdeeds, and consequently recommend harsher punishments
for errors. In contrast, liberals tend to focus on situational explanations, suggest less
severe punishment, and provide greater assistance to help offenders make amends for,
or avoid further, wrongdoing (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987; Skitka
et al., 2002; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993). More generally, there is strong evidence that
conservatives (vs. liberals) tend to blame members of devalued out-groups and protect
members of valued in-groups (Altemeyer, 1998; Jost et al., 2003). For example,
compared with liberals, conservatives attributed less responsibility for the 1991 war in
Iraq to the US government (Skitka, McMurray, & Burroughs, 1991).
The Current Research
Although the constructs of political orientation, attribution styles, and support for war
have been investigated separately, no research has explored how these variables
interact. The present research used the war in Iraq to explore whether the relationship
between political orientation and support for war were in part due to ideological
differences in attributions of responsibility. More specifically, we hypothesized that,
in comparison to liberals, conservatives would (a) support the war more strongly, (b)
attribute less responsibility for the war to the US government, and (c) attribute more
responsibility for the war to the pre-war Iraqi government. Importantly, extending
previous research, we expected that (d) differing attributions of government
responsibility would explain the varying levels of support shown by liberals and
conservatives for the war in Iraq. In other words, liberals’ and conservatives’
attributions of governmental responsibility for the war should, at least in part, account
for the effect of political orientation on support for the war.
We investigated this mediation model in three studies. In Study 1, data from a
large-scale international public opinion survey were analyzed. Study 2 replicated
and extended these findings with a different sample and improved measures of the
constructs of interest. Finally, Study 3 investigated the causal mechanism implied
by the mediation process: the idea that differences in attributions of government
responsibility can systematically influence support for the war.
Study 1
The Pew Global Attitudes Project offers a series of publicly available opinion surveys
on various topics. Data were analyzed from a 2004 survey about the war in Iraq. The
survey included an item assessing political orientation and several items representing
attributions of governmental responsibility and support for the war in Iraq.
Method
Participants
The sample comprised 1,390 adults (684 were women) who (a) participated in the
2004 Pew Global Attitudes Project and (b) fulfilled the following criteria: lived in
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the United States, indicated their political orientation, and gave answers to questions
that constituted the proposed mediator and the dependent measure (see below). The
ages of participants ranged from 18 to 91 years (M = 44.72, SD = 17.75).
Controlling for gender and age did not have any effect on the results and thus,
will not be discussed further.
Materials
All questions were from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (2004), A year after Iraq
war. The items selected for analyses measured political orientation, attribution of
government responsibility for the war, and support for the war.
Political Orientation The single-item measure of political orientation included a
five-point scale ranging from 1 (very conservative) to 5 (very liberal). Participants
were asked to indicate where their political views generally fall on this scale.
Responses to this item were reverse-scored so that higher scores represented more
conservative views.
Attributions of Government Responsibility The following question was used as a
proxy for measuring attributions of US government responsibility for the war in
Iraq: ‘‘Before the war the U.S. and Britain claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction. These weapons have yet to be found. Why do you think they made this
claim?’’ Participants were asked to choose whether the governments had made these
claims because (a) US and British leaders were misinformed by bad intelligence, (b)
US and British leaders lied to provide a reason for invading Iraq, or (c) weapons of
mass destructions (WMDs) might still be found. Responses were recoded on a three-
point scale where 1 = WMDs might still be found (representing the least amount of
government responsibility), 2 = misinformation or bad intelligence (representing
an intermediate attribution of responsibility), and 3 = assertions that the govern-
ments lied about WMDs (representing the highest attribution of government
responsibility). Previous research ties conservative political views to perceptions of
the world as a dangerous place (see Jost et al., 2003). As such, conservatives should
be more likely (as compared to liberals) to believe that WMDs exist because (a)
weapons in Iraq might be dangerous to the security of the US and (b) may be viewed
as a good justification for the war. In contrast, believing that the US government lied
about the existence of WMDs implies that the weapons do not exist and, therefore,
are not a danger. Without the justification of a threat to national security, people
should be more likely to attribute responsibility for the war to the US government.
Support for the War Three items representing people’s support for the Iraq war
served as the dependent variable. The first item asked: ‘‘On the subject of Iraq, did
the US make the right decision or the wrong decision to use military force against
Iraq?’’ (Response options: ‘‘Right decision’’ and ‘‘Wrong decision’’). The second
item measured optimism for the outcomes anticipated for the Iraqi people: ‘‘Do
you think the people of Iraq will be better off or worse off in the long run than
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they were now that Saddam Hussein has been removed from power by the US and
its allies?’’ (Response options: ‘‘better off’’ and ‘‘worse off’’). The third item asked
whether participants thought that the war in Iraq had ‘‘helped the war on terrorism
or hurt the war on terrorism.’’ (Response options ‘‘helped’’, ‘‘hurt’’, ‘‘no effect’’).
We included only participants who responded ‘‘helped’’ or ‘‘hurt’’ to this question,
because it is theoretically unclear how to interpret a ‘‘no effect’’ response in terms
of support for the war in Iraq. Answers to each item were coded so that higher
scores indicated more positive attitudes toward the war in Iraq and summed to
form a single scale representing our dependent variable, support for the war
(ranging from 0 = low support, to 3 = high support, a = .65).
Results
To test our mediation hypothesis, we followed the three-step procedure using
linear regression analyses suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). According to
this procedure, to obtain mediation (a) the independent variable (i.e., political
orientation) needs to affect the proposed mediator (attributions of responsibility),
(b) the independent variable must affect the dependent variable (support for the
war), and (c) the mediator must influence the dependent variable while
controlling for the influence of the independent variable. The influence of the
independent variable should be smaller in the third compared to the second
equation, which can be tested with a formula provided by Sobel (1982).
Complete mediation occurs if the independent variable has no independent effect
on the dependent variable when controlling for the mediator.
We predicted that attributions of government responsibility would mediate the
relationship between political orientation and support for the war. We found that
political orientation influenced the attributions of government responsibility for the
war in Iraq, with greater conservatism predicting less perceived US government
responsibility (b = -.39, t(1,388) = -15.75, p \ .001). In the second regression
analysis, greater conservatism predicted more positive attitudes toward the war in
Iraq (b = .31, t(1,388) = 12.23, p \ .001). Finally, when controlling for the effect
of perceived US government responsibility, the influence of political orientation on
attitudes toward the war was substantively reduced, though still significant
(b = .13, t(1,387) = 5.25, p \ .001). However, attributions of responsibility were
the dominant predictor of support for the war (b = -.47, t(1,387) = -19.00,
p \ .001, see Fig. 1). A Sobel (1982) test revealed that the attenuation of the direct
relationship between political orientation and support for the war was highly
significant, (z = -12.88, p \ .001).
Although the support for war items were highly correlated, these items were only
proxies and did not ask directly about support for the war. As such, we conducted
the mediation analysis for each item individually in case any one of the items
appeared less related to war support. As expected, a similar pattern of results was
obtained for each of the support for war items analyzed separately.
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Discussion
We hypothesized that the effect of political orientation on support for the war in Iraq
would be mediated by attributions regarding governmental responsibility for the
war. Initial support for this hypothesis was found using data from the 2004 Pew
Global Attitudes Project survey. The positive relationship between political
orientation and support for the war in Iraq was partially mediated by the extent
to which participants believed the US and British governments lied about Iraq
possessing weapons of mass destruction. Conservatives expressed greater support
for the war (as compared to liberals) but this effect was partially explained by the
fact that conservatives were less likely to believe that the governments lied about
Iraq possessing WMDs. In contrast, liberals were more likely to believe the US and
British governments lied and subsequently showed less support for the war in Iraq.
Despite this evidence, the data from Study 1 had some limitations. Using data
from a national survey allowed for a large and diverse sample, but required the use
of pre-written questions. As such, the items were suitable proxies for our constructs
of interest, but they were not perfect. First, concerning the mediator, attributions of
government responsibility, we assumed that people who think the US and British
governments lied about the existence of WMDs would attribute greater responsi-
bility to these governments for the war. Because the existence of WMDs was the
main justification for entering war, the absence of such evidence might lead people
to attribute greater responsibility for the war to the governments. A more direct
measurement of attributions of government responsibility would have been
desirable. Second, the items representing the support for war construct were rather
indirect. Indeed, these items concerned only one aspect of support: the general
perceived consequences of the war in Iraq. Thus, more direct measures, assessing
current opinions on the conflict and on how the US government should proceed,
were necessary.
Study 2
Study 2 was developed to build upon and strengthen the findings of Study 1. Using
scales to assess the target constructs of attributions of government responsibility and
Perceived responsibility 
of the US government 
Political Orientation Support for the war 
-.39*** 
.31*** (.13***) 
-.52*** (-.47***)
Fig. 1 Partial mediation of the effect of political orientation on support for the war in Iraq by attributions
of responsibility of the US government for the war in Study 1
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support for the war more directly, the second study attempted to replicate the
mediation analysis in a different sample.
In addition, we extended our approach to investigate a further aspect of the
attribution process proposed to mediate the effect of political orientation on support
for the war. In the previous study, the focus was on attributions of the US and
British government’s responsibility for the war. Complementing this perspective,
we expected that attributions concerning the responsibility of the pre-war Iraqi
government would have corresponding effects. It was predicted that a more
conservative political orientation would be associated with greater perceived
responsibility for the war on the part of the pre-war Iraqi government, and that this
would, in turn, lead to increased support for the war. In contrast, we predicted that
liberals would perceive that the pre-war Iraqi government was less responsible for
the war leading to decreased support for the war overall. Support for this double
tracked hypothesis would provide further evidence that attribution processes play an
important role in understanding why liberals and conservatives differ in their
commitment to the war in Iraq.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight US citizens or permanent residents (26 were women and one participant
did not indicate gender) completed an online-survey that was available from several
publicly available Internet sites (see Appendix 1 for the full list of the websites).
The ages of participants ranged from 14 to 67 years (M = 29.83, SD = 13.95).
Controlling for gender or age did not have any effect on the results and thus, will not
be discussed further. The majority of participants identified themselves as Caucasian
(68%) and as students (71%). Respondents came from 20 different states throughout
the US. The majority of participants (55%) reported that they or a close family
member had served in the military and of those 16% said that the family member
was currently or had previously served in Iraq. As a form of compensation for their
time, participants were offered entry into a lottery for one of 4 gift certificates worth
$50 each.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed a measure of political
orientation. The measure of participants’ attributions about responsibility for the
war in Iraq (the proposed mediator) was embedded among several items and was
followed by the dependent measure, support for the war. Finally, participants were
asked to provide demographic data.
Materials
Political Orientation Following previous research (e.g., Jost et al., 2007), political
orientation was assessed with a one-item measure (‘‘On the scale below, please
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select the number that best represents your political views/orientation’’). Partici-
pants could respond on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely liberal) to 9 (extremely
conservative).
Attributions of Responsibility The measures of perceived responsibility comprised
two four-item scales; one focused on the US government, the other on the pre-war
Iraqi government. An example of a statement focusing on the US government was:
‘‘The US government’s motivations for going to war in Iraq had less to do with
WMDs and more to do with obtaining oil.’’ An example of a question focusing on
the pre-war Iraqi government was: ‘‘Although the US did not immediately find
WMDs Saddam Hussein was about to initiate a new WMD program’’ (see Table 1
for the full list of items). Participants indicated their level of agreement with the
statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). All items were
coded such that high scores reflected greater perceived responsibility of the US or
the pre-war Iraqi government and two separate scales were formed, reflecting the
perceived responsibility of the respective government (aUS = .88, aIraq = .79). The
order of items was determined randomly for each participant.
Support for the War Four items adapted from Agnew et al. (2007) were used to
measure support for the war in Iraq. Items such as, ‘‘I want the war in Iraq to last as
long as necessary,’’ were presented and responses were made on a scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items formed a reliable scale
Table 1 Initial Eigenvalues of factors and maximum-likelihood loadings of US and Iraqi government
responsibility ratings in Study 2 after oblimin rotation
Component
1 2
US
Gov
Iraqi
Gov
Initial Eigenvalues 4.18 1.62
The US government’s motivations for going to war in Iraq had less to do with WMDs
and more to do with obtaining oil
.84
The administration lied about the existence of WMDs in Iraq .73
After 9/11, the Bush administration needed a scapegoat and Iraq was a good target .78
The Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq was motivated by a desire to
finish the job the first Bush administration began
.81
Although the US did not immediately find WMDs Saddam Hussein was about to
initiate a new WMD program
.73
It is very likely that the Iraqi government was attempting to secure uranium from Niger
to make a nuclear bomb
.86
Saddam Hussein and his government posed a threat to American national security .61
WMDs have yet to be found in Iraq because the Iraqi government has done a good job
hiding or destroying them
.47
Note. US Gov refers to ‘‘Perceived US government responsibility’’. Iraqi Gov refers to ‘‘Perceived pre-
war Iraqi government responsibility’’
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(a = .77, see Appendix 2 for the items). The order of items was randomly
determined for each participant.
Results
We expected that attributions of responsibility focused on the US government and
on the pre-war Iraqi government would represent separate, though negatively
correlated, constructs. To test this, the eight attribution items were analysed in a
factor analysis (with maximum-likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation) that
converged in eight iterations. Items loading .40 or greater on the components with
initial Eigenvalues greater than 1 were retained, yielding a two-component solution
(see Table 1), accounting for 72.59% of the variance. As expected, two factors
emerged; the first factor included the items concerning the US government while the
second factor included the items referring to the pre-war Iraqi government. The
factors were moderately correlated at r = -.32.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that attributions of government responsibility
would mediate the relationship between political orientation and support for war.
We followed the three-step procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986) to test
the mediation hypothesis. The US government responsibility model was tested first.
As expected, political orientation predicted attributions of responsibility such that
conservatism predicted less US government responsibility (b = -.66, t(46) =
-5.93, p \ .001). Consistent with predictions, the second step of analyses showed
that political orientation was also related to support for the war (b = .34,
t(46) = 2.45, p = .018). Finally, when controlling for the effect of perceived US
responsibility, the influence of political orientation on support for the war was no
longer significant (b = -.01, t(45) = -.03, p = .978). Simultaneously, attributions
of US government responsibility predicted support for the war (b = -.52,
t(45) = -3.10, p = .003, see Fig. 2). The attenuation of the direct relationship
between political orientation and support for the war was highly significant as
indicated by a Sobel (1982) test, (z = 3.38, p \ .001), suggesting full mediation.
These results provide a conceptual replication of Study 1 with a different sample
and different measures of responsibility and support for war.
Next, the mediation model testing pre-war Iraqi government attribution of
responsibility was tested. As hypothesized, greater conservatism predicted higher
Perceived responsibility 
of the US government 
Political Orientation Support for the war 
-.66*** -.52*** (-.52**) 
.34** (-.01, n.s.) 
Fig. 2 Full mediation of the effect of political orientation on support for the war in Iraq by attributions of
responsibility of the US government for the war in Study 2
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scores on the Iraqi government responsibility measure (b = .53, t(46) = 4.26,
p \ .001). As shown in the first set of analyses, conservatives supported the war more
strongly than did liberals (b = .34, t(46) = 2.45, p = .018). More importantly, when
controlling for the effect of perceived Iraqi government responsibility, the direct
influence of political orientation on support for the war became non-significant
(b = .09, t(45) = .62, p = .542). In contrast, pre-war Iraqi government responsibility
(controlling for political orientation) predicted support for the war (b = .47,
t(45) = 3.10, p = .003, see Fig. 3).
Consistent with the US government responsibility analysis, the Sobel (1982) test
indicated a highly significant mediation whereby the perceived responsibility of the
pre-war Iraqi government mediated the relationship between political orientation
and support for war (z = 2.94, p = .003). This result extends upon the previous
findings and provides further support for the idea that attribution processes are
important in understanding the different levels of commitment liberals and
conservatives show for the war in Iraq.
It may be objected that, in principle, the reverse mediation might be possible as
well. That is, conservatism might be associated with a tendency to directly support the
war and this pro-war attitude would then be rationalized or justified post hoc by
attributions of government responsibility. If this reasoning is correct, support for war
should mediate the relationship between political orientation and attributions of
responsibility. Although we find this reasoning less plausible from a theoretical
perspective, we tested this possibility and found that the data did not fit the alternative
explanation as well. Treating support for the war as a mediator had little effect on the
relationship between political orientation and attributions of government responsi-
bility (either US or Iraqi): Even when controlling for support for the war, political
orientation strongly predicted attributions of US government responsibility (b =
-.54, t(45) = -5.02, p \ .001). Similarly, controlling for support for the war hardly
affected the relationship between political orientation and perceived Iraqi pre-war
attributions of responsibility (b = .40, t(45) = 3.31, p = .002). In sum, in line with
our assumptions, there is strong evidence to suggest that beliefs about the US
government’s motivations and attributions of responsibility to the pre-war Iraqi
government mediate the relationship between political orientation and support for the
war in Iraq. There is little support for the explanation that these beliefs are merely a
convenient post hoc justification for pro-war attitudes.
.53*** 
.34*** (.09, n.s.) 
.52*** (.47**) 
Perceived responsibility of 
the pre-war Iraqi government 
Political Orientation Support for the war 
Fig. 3 Full mediation of the effect of political orientation on support for the war in Iraq by attributions of
responsibility of the pre-war Iraqi government for the war in Study 2
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Discussion
Studies 1 and 2 provide converging evidence for the proposed role of perceived
government responsibility for the war. The studies suggest that beliefs about
attributions of government responsibility produce changes in the level of support for
the war. Mediation analyses provided stronger support for the current model
compared to an alternative explanation. The effect of political orientation on support
for the war in Iraq was fully mediated by attributions of responsibility for the war.
However, political orientation remained a strong predictor of attributions of
responsibility when controlling for support for the war.
One may argue that it is not political orientation that influences support for the
war (via attributions of responsibility), but instead, that the causal pathway is
reversed. That is, greater support for the war may lead to a shift in political
orientation via lower levels of government blame. From a theoretical perspective,
we deem this possibility unlikely. Political orientation is considered a rather stable
construct (Sears, 1983), associated with several stable personality characteristics
(Block & Block, 2006) and determined by psychological needs (Jost et al., 2003)
that may be rooted in genetic dispositions (Alford et al., 2005) and physiological
traits (Oxley et al., 2008). However, both studies 1 and 2 used survey data and
correlational analyses that do not allow for causal conclusions. To show that
differences in the attributions of government responsibility for the war in Iraq can
indeed cause changes in support for the war as hypothesized, a manipulation (rather
than measurement) of attributions is required.
Study 3
In the final study, attributions of responsibility for the war were manipulated. More
specifically, participants were led to believe that there was a consensus among
political scholars that either (a) the US government misrepresented information
about the actual threat posed by Iraq prior to the war or that (b) the pre-war Iraqi
government represented a serious threat as a result of a WMD program. We
expected that participants who were led to believe the Iraq government posed a
serious threat to US security prior to the war would indicate stronger support for the
war than participants who were led to believe that the US government misrepre-
sented important information. This outcome would support the assumption of the
causal mechanism inherent in our mediation model.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and fifty-seven US citizens and permanent residents (92 women)
completed an online-study available from the same sites as Study 2. No participant
from Study 1 participated in Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to either
a ‘‘US government responsibility’’ condition or a ‘‘Pre-war Iraqi government
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responsibility’’ condition. The ages of participants ranged from 15 to 77 years
(M = 29.00, SD = 12.59). Controlling for gender or age did not have any effect on
the results and thus, will not be discussed further. The majority of participants
identified themselves as Caucasians (81%) and as students (62%). As in Study 2, a
majority of participants said that a close family member served in the military
(61%) and of those, 18% said that the family member had served or was currently
serving in Iraq. Again, the chance to enter a lottery for one of four $50 gift
certificates was offered as a compensation for the participants’ contributions to the
research.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants read a short paragraph about the war,
which they were told was a recent news report. Information in the ‘‘news report’’
manipulated participants’ attributions of responsibility for the war in Iraq. Several
questions, including the dependent variable, support for the war, followed the short
paragraph. Demographic information was collected along with several one-sentence
descriptions of the news report used to check that participants had read the
manipulations. Finally, participants were carefully debriefed.
Materials
Manipulation of Attributions and Debriefing In the ‘‘US government responsibil-
ity’’ condition, participants read a ‘‘news article’’ stating that a conservative and a
liberal think tank recently agreed that the US government largely misrepresented the
intelligence information regarding the threat posed by Iraq prior to the invasion. In
the ‘‘Pre-war Iraqi government responsibility’’ condition, participants read a ‘‘news
article’’ stating that a conservative and a liberal think tank agreed that the Iraqi
government, led by Saddam Hussein, had intentions to start WMD programs (see
Appendix 3 for the full articles). At the end of the study, participants were informed
that the ‘‘news reports’’ had been created by the researchers and that the current
consensus among most news sources was that Iraq did not possess WMDs.
Support for the War The items assessing support for the war in Iraq were the same
as those used in Study 2.
Results and Discussion
We restricted the data analyses to those participants who correctly identified the
news report presented to them at the beginning of the survey. We reasoned that the
manipulations could only be effective if participants actually read the texts;
therefore, individuals who could not identify the correct description of the news
report were excluded from analyses.
It was hypothesized that reading a news report suggesting that the US
government (pre-war Iraqi government) was responsible for the war in Iraq would
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decrease (increase) support for the war. To test this hypothesis we ran a t-test with
the condition as the independent variable and support for the war as the dependent
variable. As expected, support for the war was higher in the ‘‘Pre-war Iraqi
government responsible’’ condition (MIraq = 3.86, SD = 1.67) than in the ‘‘US
government responsible’’ condition (MUS = 3.03, SD = 1.75), t(103) = -2.47,
p = .015. This result suggests that attributions of responsibility for the war in Iraq
can indeed directly influence support for the war, as hypothesized in our mediation
model.
General Discussion
In this article, we investigated one mechanism by which individual differences in
political ideology influence support for war. Drawing on the literature on political
orientation as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003), we hypothesized that
liberals and conservatives would ascribe responsibility for the war in Iraq
differently. More specifically, it was predicted that conservatives (vs. liberals)
would attribute less responsibility to the US government and greater responsibility
to the pre-war Iraqi government. Differing attributions were expected to explain
why conservatives displayed stronger support for the war. Three studies supported
these predictions. In Study 1, data from a large-scale public opinion survey revealed
that attributions of responsibility to the US government partially mediated the
relationship between political orientation and support for the war. Study 2 replicated
this effect and showed that attributions of pre-war Iraqi government responsibility
similarly mediated the relationship between political orientation and support for the
war. Finally, using an experimental approach, Study 3 showed that manipulating
attributions of responsibility can indeed cause changes in support for the war.
It is worthwhile pointing out several strengths of the present research. First, the
data from Study 1 were collected in March 2004, only one year after the US
occupation of Iraq. The same psychological mechanism appeared to mediate the
influence of political orientation on support for the war in Iraq almost four years
later, when the data for Study 2 were collected (late November 2007 to late January
2008). Results were also consistent in the face of (a) different operationalizations of
the key constructs and (b) considerably different samples, recruited by a professional
survey institute (Study 1) and via publicly available websites (Study 2). All samples,
however, were clearly more heterogeneous both in terms of age and education than
the usual student samples commonly employed in psychological experiments.
Finally, it speaks to the validity of our theoretical analysis that it was possible to
change participants’ support for the war, at least to some extent, by manipulating
attributions of government responsibility (Study 3), despite an extensive and
enduring media-coverage of the war over the years.
We do not claim that attributions of responsibility are the single factor by which
political orientation translates into varying degrees of support for a war. In fact, the
motivated social cognition perspective on political orientation (Jost et al., 2003)
offers several other related factors that lend themselves to similar hypotheses; these
include, but are not limited to, dogmatism (Rokeach, 1956, 1960), the belief that the
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world is a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1998), and the belief that the world is just
(Lerner, 1980). Future research should start to disentangle both the joint and unique
contributions of the various factors believed to be the antecedents of people’s
political orientation and the beliefs and attitudes associated with such positions.
To that end, future research may also begin to explore the underlying
psychological pathways, which precede the mediators investigated in the current
research (i.e., belief that the US government had good intentions, belief that the
Iraqi government posed a threat to national security). It is likely that these mediators
are influenced by different underlying psychological constructs. For example, it is
possible that the relationship between political orientation and the belief in the
WMD program is underpinned by the belief in a dangerous world. However, it may
also be the case that other individual differences (for example, concern with ingroup
loyalty versus concern with reciprocity and harm; Haidt & Graham, 2007) also
account for some of the variation in a belief that Iraq posed a serious threat. Future
research will be needed to determine what portion of the variance each variable
explains, and whether these relationships change in different contexts.
Conclusion
The war in Iraq has become a contentious issue in recent times. While previous
research has shown that political orientation is related to support for the Iraq war,
with more conservative views associated with greater support, there has been little
research investigating the psychological processes explaining this relationship.
Thus, the current research adds to the understanding of political orientation by
showing that such views influence the way individuals attribute responsibility for
the war. Different attribution styles are one factor that account for the relationship
between political orientation and support for the war. Political orientation does
matter, but attributions are crucial to the understanding of the psychological
mechanisms that lead to its consequences.
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Appendix 1
List of websites used for data collection in Study 2 and Study 3.
http://www.socialpsychology.org/expts.htm
http://genpsylab-wexlist.unizh.ch/
http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html
http://umpsychology.sona-systems.com/
http://www.politicsforumpoliticalworld.com/
http://allsidespoliticalforums.com/
http://politicalhotwire.com/
http://www.4forums.com
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Appendix 2
Items used to assess support for the war in Studies 2 and 3, adapted from Agnew
et al. (2007). Agnew et al. used questions referring to the ‘‘war on terror.’’ These
were changed to reference the ‘‘war in Iraq.’’
1. I want the war in Iraq to last as long as necessary.
2. I am committed to the US maintaining the war in Iraq as long as necessary.
3. I would not feel very upset if the war in Iraq were to fail. (reverse coded)
4. I am prepared for the war in Iraq to be waged over a long period of time.
Appendix 3
Manipulations of attributions for responsibility for the war in Study 3
Condition ‘‘US Government Responsibility’’
Conservative and liberal experts agree that the US government misrepresented
threat posed by Iraq. On March 19, 2003, President Bush announced the start of the
Iraq war and urged the American people to give their support.
‘‘My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early
stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the
world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking
selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to
wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted
campaign.’’
More than 4 years later, reports from the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
think tank, and from the Institute for Policy Studies, a liberal think tank, agree that
the US government largely misrepresented the intelligence information regarding
the threat posed by Iraq. ‘‘Intelligence reports available prior to the start of the Iraq
war strongly suggested that Saddam had no intention of restarting WMD
programs’’, says Dr. Chris Evans, a national security expert from the Heritage
Foundation. The former head of UN weapons inspections confirmed this statement
shortly after the start of the Iraq war. By January 2005, ‘‘intelligence officials
confirmed that the US had stopped searching for weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. There were no stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons at the time of the
US-led invasion’’, says Dr. Paul Smith, an Iraq foreign policy specialist from the
Institute for Policy Studies.
Condition ‘‘Pre-war Iraqi Government Responsible’’
Conservative and liberal experts agree that former Iraqi government’s WMD
program intentions posed an international threat. On March 19, 2003, President
Bush announced the start of the Iraq war and urged the American people to give
their support.
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‘‘My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early
stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the
world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking
selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein’s ability to
wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted
campaign.’’
More than 4 years later, reports from the Heritage Foundation, a conservative
think tank, and from the Institute for Policy Studies, a liberal think tank, agree that
the former Iraqi government, led by Saddam Hussein, had intentions to start WMD
programs. ‘‘Intelligence reports strongly suggest that Saddam Hussein’s govern-
ment posed a grave threat to international security at the time of the US-led
invasion’’, says Dr. Chris Evans, a national security expert from the Heritage
Foundation. The former head of UN weapons inspections confirmed this shortly
after the start of the Iraq war. According to Dr. Paul Smith, an Iraq foreign policy
specialist from the Institute for Policy Studies, ‘‘Saddam’s government intended to
start WMD programs—to stockpile chemical and biological weapons—at the time of
the US-led invasion. American foreign policy had to address this imminent threat to
international security.’’
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